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Abstract 
We give an interpretation of the Maxi­
mum Entropy (MaxEnt) Principle in game­
theoretic terms. Based on this interpretation, 
we make a formal distinction between differ­
ent ways of applying Maximum Entropy dis­
tributions. MaxEnt has frequently been crit­
icized on the grounds that it leads to highly 
representation dependent results. Our dis­
tinction allows us to avoid this problem in 
many cases. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Maximum Entropy Principle (Jaynes, 1989) is 
an often successful yet controversial method for in­
ductive inference. It has been justified and criticized 
in many different ways (Jaynes, 1989; Grove et al., 
1994; Halpern & Koller, 199 5). Here we give a novel 
game-theoretic justification that is fundamentally dif­
ferent from previous ones: we show that the Max­
Ent distribution for a given constraint is the distribu­
tion that minimizes the worst-case expected loss when 
used for prediction in a certain game. We give sev­
eral interpretations of this game. We argue that the 
game-theoretic interpretation is more natural than the 
usual one, and that it sheds new light on the circum­
stances in which MaxEnt can be fruitfully applied. 
Specifically, there are applications of MaxEnt where 
the same inference problem may be associated with 
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several different games with different worst-case opti­
mal strategies. We use this insight to formally distin­
guish between qualitatively different ways of applying 
a MaxEnt distribution, ranging from 'completely safe' 
to 'completely untrustworthy' applications. This also 
leads to a partial solution of Bertrand's paradox, i.e. 
the representation dependency of MaxEnt inferences. 
Sections 2-4 introduce notation and review MaxEnt 
and the representation dependency problem. Section 5 
gives our game-theoretic reinterpretation. Sections 6-8 
show how the reinterpretation can be used to distin­
guish between different ways of applying MaxEnt and 
to (sometimes) avoid Bertrand's paradox. 
2 PRELIMINARIES 
Consider a finite sample space n. We reserve the use of 
random variable X to denote outcomes inn. All other 
random variables can be vector valued, i.e. they are 
by definition functions from n to R k for some k > 0. 
For random variable Y : n -t R k, we define the range 
of Y, denoted by !!y, as 
By this notation !!x = n. We let Pv stand for 
the family of all probability distributions over !!y. 
For a Py E Pv and Av � !!y, Pv(Av) denotes 
the probability mass of Av under Py. For distri­
butions Px E Px, the notation Px(Y = y) is short 
for Px({x E nx I Y(x) = y}). Let Py E Py and 
Pz E Pz be distributions over !!y and nz respec­
tively. We say that Py and Pz are compatible (with 
underlying space nx) if there exists a Px E Px such 
that for ally E !!v,Px(Y = y) = Pv({y}) and for 
all z E !!z, Px(Z = z) = Pz({z}). Intuitively, Py 
and Pz are compatible if they can be thought of as 
marginal distributions of a single distribution Px de­
fined over the more fine-grained space !!x. We fre­
quently use random variables that are indicator func­
tions. The indicator function for event A � Ox is 
denoted by lxEA and defined by lxEA = 1 if X E A 
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and 0 otherwise. A measure for Dy is a function 
My : Dy --+ (0, oo) . It is extended to arbitrary events 
Ay � Dy by M(Ay) := L:yEAv My(y). 'Compatibil­
ity' of measures My and Mz is defined analogously to 
compatibility of probability distributions Py and Pz. 
The entropy of a distribution P over Dx relative to 
measure M over Dx is defined as 
P(X) M(x) 
1-lM(P) := Ep(-ln M(X)
] = L P(x) In P(x) . xEOx 
Notational Convention If a distribution, (or mea­
sure, or set of distributions) is denoted with a subscript 
Y for some random variable Y, we mean a distribution 
(measure, set of distributions) over Dy (examples are 
Py, My, Cy ). If a distribution (measure, set of dis­
tributions) is denoted without subscript, it is always 
a distribution (measure, set of distributions) over the 
basic sample space nx = n. 
3 REVIEW OF MAXENT 
Let ¢h, ... , ¢k be functions from Dx to R. In the 
usual MaxEnt setting, we are given a set of constraints 
regarding the expected values of the functions ¢i under 
some unknown distribution P*: 
where the ti are values in R. By taking the ¢i to be 
indicator functions we can express constraints of the 
form P* (Y = y) = t for arbitrary random variables Y. 
We now ask the following question: if the only knowl­
edge we have about P* are the constraints given by 
(1), what is then our 'best' guess for P*? (for in­
terpretations of 'best' see Section 6). According to 
the adherents of maximum entropy we should adopt 
the distribution P that, among all the distributions 
satisfying the constraints (1), maximizes the entropy 
1-lM(P). To formalize this idea we first abbreviate the 
constraints ( 1) to 
Ep· [¢(X)] = t. (2) 
Here ¢(X) = (¢1 (X), ... , ¢k (X))T is a function from 
Dx to Rk and t is a k-dimensional vector (t1, . . .  , tk) T. 
Each constraint of form (2) determines a set of proba­
bility distributions satisfying the constraint. This set 
is denoted by C: 
C := { P  E Px I Ep[cp(X)] = t}. (3) 
In all our theorems and propositions, we will assume 
the following 
Regularity conditions (A) Dx is finite; (B) the set 
C mentioned in the theorems is defined as in (3) and is 
non-empty (this means that every conceivable ¢ and t 
are allowed as long as C is non-empty). 
We can now define maximum entropy inference for­
mally: given a tuple (D, M, ¢,C), where M is a mea­
sure over n and ¢ and C are as in (3), MaxEnt tells us 
to adopt the distribution PJ:? given by 
P(X) 
PJ:? := arg max 1iM(P) = arg max Ep(-ln M(X)
]. 
PEC PEC 
(4) 
Our regularity conditions are sufficient to ensure that 
a unique PJ:;e always exists. 
4 MAXENT, MEASURE AND 
RE PRESENTATION DEPENDENCY 
Several versions of MaxEnt and of the related mini­
mum relative entropy principles exist in the literature. 
By making the entropy 1iM dependent on an underly­
ing measure M, we can account for all of these with our 
Equation 4. We distinguish between two main forms: 
Case A: M NOT available (U-MaxEnt) This 
is the 'classical' form of MaxEnt for discrete sample 
spaces (Jaynes, 1989). It does not mention any un­
derlying measure and tells us to pick the distribution 
P E C maximizing Ep[-ln P(X)]. It can be imple­
mented in (4) by taking M to be the uniform measure 
over the sample space Dx, defined by M(x) := 1. We 
will refer to this form of MaxEnt as U-MaxEnt. 
Case B: M available We will refer to this case 
simply as 'MaxEnt'. It has two sub-cases: first, the 
case where a unique measure ('natural way of counting 
outcomes') is available a priori. Sometimes, through 
knowledge of the physics of the domain that is being 
modeled, one can decide on a unique underlying mea­
sure M that is appropriate for the domain at hand (for 
ways to determine such a measure, see (Jaynes, 1989)). 
( 4) can be directly applied here. Second, the Minimum 
Relative Entropy Principle. This is the case where a 
prior probability Q over nx is known, and the goal 
is to 'update' this prior probability based on the con­
straint (2). The minimum relative entropy principle 
tells us to pick the P minimizing Ep[ln(P(X)/Q(X))]. 
By picking M = Q,  this can be represented as maxi­
mizing entropy relative to M. 
If a priori knowledge about the domain other than 
the given constraint (2) is completely lacking, then 
U-MaxEnt (case A) is the only form we can apply. 
Unfortunately, case A is also the most problematic by 
far. In contrast to case B, case A typically gives results 
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that are highly representation dependent: if the same 
domain is represented in a different language, Max­
Ent may lead to different results. Since the choice of 
representation seems arbitrary, the results one obtains 
using U-MaxEnt seem arbitrary as well. This fact is­
at least in the case of continuous data - often referred 
to as Bertrand's Paradox. 
Example 1 (a simple Bertrand's Paradox) Let 
nx = { 1, 2, 3} and let there be no further constraints 
(in our formulation, this can be expressed by picking 
¢(x) = 0 and constraint Ep· [¢(X)] = 0). Consider an 
agent (call him Mr. X) who wants to infer a distri­
bution over Dx and who uses U-MaxEnt. Hence he 
picks PrJ; as given by ( 4) with U x the uniform mea­
sure over Dx . As is well known, the resulting PrJ; is 
the uniform distribution over Dx . Now consider an­
other agent (Mrs. Y) who looks at the same domain 
at a coarser level. Specifically, she can only distin­
guish between the case where X = 1 on the one hand 
and X E { 2, 3} on the other hand. Mrs. Y's sample 
space is therefore !1y = { { 1  }, {2, 3}}. If Mrs. Y uses 
U-MaxEnt she will adopt a uniform measure Uy over 
!1y. She will then infer a distribution PrJ: uniform 
over !1y. Then PrJ;( {1}) = 1/2, P{}';( {1}) = 1/3: the 
distributions inferred by Mr. X and Mrs. Y are incom­
patible, even though they are based on the same do­
main. For more subtle examples of this phenomenon, 
see for example (Halpern & Koller, 1995). In our for­
mulation (with underlying measure), Bertrand's para­
dox can be equivalently expressed as the dependency 
of PJ:r on the choice of underlying measure M. In our 
example, if Mrs. Y uses the measure M{r defined by 
M{r( {2, 3}) := 2 and My({1}) := 1 then she will infer 
P't:fi' ( { 1}) = 1 /3 after all: this change of measure over 
y !1y has the same effect on the probability assignments 
to elements of !1y as the representation change from 
!1y (with measure Uy) to the more fine-grained Dx 
(with measure U x) . This observation will be made 
precise in Theorem 2, Section 7. 
Important In many cases, physical background knowl­
edge provides a 'natural' space for representing the 
domain at hand. For example, if we are to investigate 
the probabilities of the faces of a (possibly loaded) 
die, then by symmetry considerations, we should not 
distinguish a priori between the six faces. It is then 
only natural to take as basic sample space the space 
with exactly one outcome for each face, and to take a 
uniform measure over this space. The representation 
dependency should be considered problematic only if 
there is no preferred 'natural' sample space or (equiv­
alently, by Theorem 2), no natural underlying mea­
sure/prior. 
Some people do not see the above example as problem­
atic: the two agents are facing different 'experimental 
situations', so it is not so strange that they obtain 
different results. But then the question is: what ex­
actly constitutes an 'experimental situation'? It is this 
question we will partially answer through our game­
theoretic reinterpretation of MaxEnt, which we pro­
ceed to discuss. 
5 MAXENT AS A GAME 
The information inequality (Cover & Thomas, 1991) 
tells us that for all distributions p and Q over nx ' 
Ep[-ln P(X)] :S Ep[-ln Q(X)], (5) 
with equality iff P = Q. This implies infQEPx 
Ep[-ln(Q(X)/M(X))] Ep[-ln(P(X)/M(X))] 
and hence entropy can be characterized as: 1iM(P) = 
infQEPx Ep[-ln(Q(X)/M(X))]. The maximum at­
tainable entropy for distributions in a set C is therefore 
given by 
sup 1iM(P) =sup inf Ep[-ln 
M
Q(
(
X
X
)
)
]. (6) 
PEC PECQEPx 
Readers familiar with game theory (see e.g. (Berger, 
198 5)) will recognize (6) as the maximin gain of a two­
player zero-sum game. If they are acquainted with 
Von Neumann's minimax theorem, they may further 
suspect that the following equality holds: 
inf sup Ep[-ln 
M
Q(
(
X
X
)
)
] = QEPx PEC 
sup inf Ep[-ln 
M
Q(
(
X
X
)
)
] = 1iM(PJ:;e). (7) 
PECQEPx 
This equality indeed holds under very mild conditions, 
although this does not follow directly from Von Neu­
mann or Nash's theorems (which cannot handle arbi­
trary convex sets of mixed strategies such as C): 
Theorem 1 Under the regularity conditions of 
Section 3, Equation 7 holds. Moreover, (a) 
SUPPEC infQEPx Ep[-ln(Q(X)jM(X))] is reached for 
(and only for) P = PJ:r; 
{b) infQEPx supPEC Ep[-ln(Q(X)/M(X))] is reached 
for (and only for) Q = PJ:r. Hence (c) we have 
me . E [ I 
P(X) 
] PM = arg mm sup p• - n M(X) 
, 
PEPx P*EC 
(8) 
{d) PJ:je is an 'equalizer strategy', i.e. for all P* E C, 
PJ:[e(X) _ PJ:[e(X) Ep· [-ln M(X) 
) - Ep;;e [-ln M(X) 
) (9) 
A similar theorem with much less conditions on Dx 
and C will be provided in (Grunwald & Dawid, 2000). 
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Basic Interpretation Consider the decision­
theoretic setting where an Agent has to make deci­
sions about the outcomes in some space Ox. Agent's 
decisions come from a decision space V and the loss is 
measured by some function LOSS : Ox xV --+ RU{oo}. 
After making a decision 8 E V, the actual outcome 
x E Ox is revealed and Agent incurs a loss Loss(x, 8). 
Sometimes the decisions 8 are best interpreted as 
predictions of the values of x, sometimes they are best 
interpreted as game playing strategies. 
The logarithmic loss function is a loss function that 
occurs in several games with several interpretations 
(Berger, 198 5; Cover & Thomas, 1991). The set V 
of available decisions for these games consists of all 
functions P :  Ox --+ [0, 1) such that LxEflx P(x) = 1. 
Hence V is formally equivalent to Px. However, as we 
will see, the elements of V sometimes have interpreta­
tions very different from probability distributions. The 
logarithmic loss function (relative to measure M) is de­
fined by LOSS(x, P) = -ln(P(x)/M(x)) for each x E 
Ox and P E V. Consider now a game where Nature 
chooses a 'true' distribution P* and Agent wants to 
minimize his expected logarithmic loss. If Agent knew 
P*, he would choose arg minPEPx Ep· [Loss(X, P)]. 
By the information inequality (5) we see that this is 
given by P = P*. But now consider the case where 
Agent only knows that P* E C for some set C. He may 
now want to minimize his worst-case (maximal) ex­
pected logarithmic loss over all choices of Nature. This 
is exactly what is expressed by (8): the maximum en­
tropy distribution is the worst-case optimal distribution 
for predicting outcomes of Ox when loss is measured 
by the logarithmic loss function. 
Why would Agent at all be interested in minimizing 
logarithmic loss? This game has several important in­
terpretations. Below we discuss one that is of specific 
interest in the remainder of this paper; others are sum­
marized in Section 5.2. 
5.1 KELLY GAMBLING INTERPRETATION 
Imagine a lottery where there are tickets for sale for 
betting on outcomes in Ox = {1, ... , m }. Ticket j 
(for 1 � j � m) pays b units if outcome j actually 
occurs; otherwise, it pays nothing. All tickets cost 1 
unit, so all outcomes share the same odds. Agent has 
some capital K which he wants to invest in lottery 
tickets. Suppose that Agent thinks that the actual 
outcomes are distributed according to some distribu­
tion P*. Agent's gambling strategy can be described 
by a vector P = (P(1), . . .  , P(m)) where P(j) is the 
fraction of capital K that Agent invests in outcome 
j. That is, he buys P(j) · K tickets for outcome j; 
for convenience we allow buying a non-integer amount 
of tickets. If Agent plays the game only once, then 
his expected gain Ep· [bK P(X)] is maximized by the 
strategy with P(j) = 1 for the j with maximum prob­
ability P* (j). But now suppose Agent plays the same 
game several times. After each round, he reinvests his 
remaining capital by buying tickets for the next round. 
So after round 1, his capital is KI = P(xi)bK where 
XI is the actual outcome at round 1. After round 2, 
his capital is K2 = P(x 2 )bKI etc. If the number of 
rounds n is not too small or if it is not known in 
advance how many rounds there will be, it becomes 
better for Agent to adopt a fundamentally different 
strategy, sometimes called proportional gambling or 
the Kelly gambling scheme (Cover & Thomas, 1991, 
Chapter 7). This is defined as the gambling strategy 
P maximizing Ep· [In P(X)). This quantity may be 
interpreted as the expected growth rate of the invested 
capital. To see why this is a sensible strategy, let P 
and Q be two distributions such that Ep. [In P(X)) > 
Ep· [In Q(X)]. Suppose the game is played n times, 
and outcomes XI, ... , Xn are all independently dis­
tributed ,...., P*. Then, by the strong law of large 
numbers, (1/n)L.::�=Iln P(X;)--+ Ep.[ln P(X)] and 
(1/n) L.:�=Iln Q(X;) --+ Ep· [In Q(X)) with probabil­
ity 1. It follows that there exists an € > 0 such that 
with probability 1, for all large n, I:�= I In P(X;) > 
L.:�=I In Q(X;) + m. This implies 
n n 
(10) 
i=I i=I 
with ?*-probability 1, for all n larger than some n0. 
If Agent uses strategy P at each round i, his capi­
tal after n rounds is given by K bn TI�=I P(x;) . To­
gether with (10) this implies that for any two strate­
gies P and Q, with P* probability 1, Agent's end cap­
ital is exponentially larger for the strategy with larger 
expected growth rate. So (at least if n is large or 
unknown) a rational Agent should adopt the strat­
egy P maximizing Ep· [In P(X)]. If the only thing 
Agent knows about P* is that P* E C, it is a good 
idea for the Agent to maximize his worst-case expected 
growth rate, i.e. to pick the strategy P that maximizes 
minp•EC Ep· [In P(X)], which is identical to the distri­
bution minimizing maxp•EC Ep· [-ln P(X)). The lat­
ter distribution is the MaxEnt distribution with uni­
form measure M: PJ:r is the worst-case optimal distri­
bution in the Kelly gambling game, maximizing, with 
probability 1, the worst-case end-capital for all large n. 
A uniform underlying measure M corresponds to the 
game with equal odds for all outcomes; non-uniform 
measures correspond to games with non-uniform odds. 
5.2 MDL & OTHER INTERPRETATIONS 
The minimax game (8) has several other interpreta­
tions. We mention two. First, there is a statistical in-
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terpretation: many statistical inference procedures can 
be interpreted as trying to infer, for a given set of data, 
the probability model within some class of models M 
that is 'as close as possible' to the unknown, 'true' 
data generating distribution P*. In Maximum Likeli­
hood and some Bayesian inference procedures, 'close­
ness' is measured by means of the Kullback-Leibler KL­
distance, which, for fixed P* and M, only differs from 
the expected logarithmic loss Ep· [-ln(P(X)/M(X))] 
by a constant. Second, there is an interpretation 
in terms of the Minimum Description Length (MDL) 
Principle (Grunwald, 1998), a method for inductive in­
ference that is based on data compression. MDL can 
be seen as a mathematical formalization of Occam's 
Razor. It turns out that based on the minimax for­
mulation (8), MaxEnt can be interpreted as a form of 
MDL; this is shown in (Grunwald, 1998). Finally, we 
note that even if we do not assume the existence of a 
unique true distribution P* (to which for example the 
Bayesians may object) a form of our analysis can still 
be performed. All this will be treated in detail in the 
journal version of this paper. 
6 THE GLASSES YOU ARE 
LOOKING THROUGH 
Let us now stand back and ask why Agent would like 
to infer a probability distribution over a domain in the 
first place. Usually, this is because he would like to 
make good or at least reasonable predictions or deci­
sions concerning some random variable Y referring to 
the domain (more general prediction tasks will be con­
sidered in later sections). If Y is a random variable in 
the domain and V is a set of available decisions, then 
the quality of such decisions is usually measured by 
some loss function LOSS : S1y x V -t RU { oo}. If Agent 
knew the 'true' distribution P* governing domain f!x, 
then he could use this knowledge to make optimal pre­
dictions for any given loss function by predicting us­
ing the action J = arg minoE'D Ep· [Loss (Y, 8)] (Berger, 
198 5). 
But the interpretation of PJ.:le from the minimax point 
of view (8) suggests that PJ.:le should first and fore­
most be interpreted as the strategy to adopt in the 
game described in Section 5 and not as the distribu­
tion P* according to which data are distributed. This 
leads to a key insight: perhaps we should not regard 
PJ.:le as a guess of the 'true' P* to be used by Agent 
in every prediction task that can be defined over the 
domain. It may be better to think of PJ.:le as being 
wrong yet useful in that it may be a reasonable guess 
of P* for use in some possible prediction tasks (i.e. for 
some random variables and loss functions) but a quite 
unreasonable guess for use in other combinations of 
random variables and loss functions1. To make this 
idea concrete, suppose Agent has no access to P* but 
approximates it using PJ.:}". For given loss function 
LOSS , Agent can use PJ.:le to arrive at a prediction by 
picking 
J = argmin Epm• [ LOSS (Y, 8)]. (11) 
oE'D M 
In general, this will lead to reasonable results if V8 E 
V: EpM• [LOss (Y, 8)] � Ep· [LOss(Y, 8)]. For each 8 E 
V, the function 'ljJ defined by '1/J (x) := LOSS(Y(x), 8) is 
a random variable. Hence, in order to be able to decide 
for arbitrary loss function LOSS whether PJ.:le as used 
in ( 11) will lead to reasonable predictions, it suffices if 
for arbitrary random variables 'ljJ : f!x -t R k, we can 
decide whether EpM• ['1/J (X)] is a reasonable guess for 
Ep· ['1/J (X)]. Let us analyze this question further. 
In order to predict the likely value of Ep· ['1/J (X)], 
Agent must assign probabilities to the values in f!w 
that random variable 'ljJ takes. This involves 'looking 
at the domain' in terms of the function '1/J; in other 
words, 'ljJ determines the 'glasses' through which Agent 
looks at data X from sample space S1x. But when in­
ferring PJ.:le, Agent observes averages of values of the 
function ¢. Hence Agent looks at the world in terms 
of f!.p. As discussed in Section 5.1, PJ.:le maximizes 
the worst-case gain when used for Kelly Gambling on 
the outcomes in f!x against odds determined by M. 
We may now ask ourselves why Agent should be in­
terested in a distribution that maximizes gain when 
betting on outcomes in nx if both the observables 
(¢(X)) and the 'predictables' ('1/J (X)) are outcomes in 
spaces different from S1x. If no a priori measure M 
is available, U-MaxEnt advocates a uniform M. But 
should Agent adopt a uniform M over f!x, f!.p or f!w? 
Indeed ¢, 'ljJ and X may be related in such a way that 
the optimal gambling strategies against uniform odds 
for outcomes in nx, f!.p and n"' are mutually incom­
patible. This immediately suggests that postulating a 
uniform measure over f!x may not be the right thing 
to do; and that it is not so strange that it leads to 
representation dependence. Analyzing this fact with 
the game-theoretic interpretation in mind, we find (in 
Section 8.3) that if ¢ and 'ljJ are related in a certain 
way, we can do something about this. Namely, as long 
as f!w is at least as 'coarse' as f!.p ('looking at an out­
come x through the 'glasses' ¢ allows a view on f!x 
1Related ideas are quite common in statistics and Ma­
chine Learning. As an example, 'Naive Bayes' models are 
joint probability distributions defined over discrete random 
variables X 1, .. . , Xk, Y of a certain parametric form. They 
usually perform exceedingly well when used to predict val­
ues of y conditional on xl, ... xk (Friedman et al., 1997) 
under the 0/1 {classification} loss function. Yet they make 
all kinds of unwarranted independence assumptions that 
might lead to disastrous results if they were used to pre­
dict, say, the value of x2 conditional on the value of xl. 
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that is at least as fine-grained as the view through the 
glasses 'lj; '), it is still possible to postulate an a priori 
measure M (not necessarily uniform over Ox) such 
that the Kelly gambling games on outcomes in O.p and 
01/1 and Ox against odds determined by M share the 
same worst-case optimal strategy PJ:;e. Moreover, as 
we shall see, postulating M in this way makes PJ.:? 
representation independent as long as it is only used 
for predictions concerning random variables 'lj; that are 
at least as 'coarse' as ¢. Similarly, under stronger con­
ditions on the relation between the functions ¢ and 'lj;, 
one can guarantee not only that PJ:? is representa­
tion independent but even that Ep;:;e ['1/J ] = Ep· ['1/J ], 
i.e. that the MaxEnt guess of Ep· ['1/J ] is correct. 
The moral of the story is that, depending on how the 
'glasses' (ways of looking at the data) ¢ and 'lj; are re­
lated, applying MaxEnt may (a) be inherently repre­
sentation dependent (and should therefore not be used 
at all), or (b) be representation independent but not 
guaranteed to be 'optimal' or 'correct' (in this case it 
can be used as an inductive guess) or (c) be guaranteed 
to lead to correct or optimal predictions (in which case 
it should certainly be used). In Section 8 we formalize 
this distinction. We first need to establish the relation 
between representations and underlying measures. 
7 REPRESENTATION & MEASURE 
In this section we will show that if we stick to a fixed 
measure, the results given by MaxEnt are invariant 
under all reasonable representation changes. 
For two random variables Y and Z we say that Y de­
termines Z if there exists a function g : Oy -+ Oz such 
that for each x E 0, g(Y(x)) = Z(x) . In the language 
of measure theory, this can be simply expressed as 'Z 
is measurable in the u-algebra generated by Y'. More 
generally, we say that 'Y determines Z over A � Ox' 
if there exists g : Oy -+ Oz such that for each X E A, 
g(Y(x)) = Z(x) . A set Ov is an underlying space for 
space Oz if there exists a function h : Ov -+ Oz such 
that for all z E Oz, there exists v E Ov with h(v) = z. 
We can think of an underlying space Ov as a space that 
is at least as or more fine-grained than Oz. If V is a 
random variable Ox -+ Ov, then this simply means 
that V determines Z. The notion is more general in 
that we can take Z =X. In this case, Ov provides a 
new sample space such that all random variables that 
can be expressed as functions of Ox can also be ex­
pressed as functions of Ov. Let Ov be an underlying 
space for Ox. For any random variable Y : Ox -+ R, 
we write Yv to denote the random variable Ov -+ R 
that corresponds to Y in the underlying space: for all 
v E Ov, Yv(v) := Y(h(v)) with h : Ov -+ Ox de­
fined as above. With this convention, the function h 
itself can be written as h = Yv. More generally, let 
Wv and Tv be any two random variables Ov -+ R 
in the underlying space Ov, such that Wv determines 
Tv. Then Tw is defined as a function Ow -+ R with 
Vv E Ov : Tw(Wv(v)) := Tv(v) (in other words, Tw 
is a random variable in the intermediate space Ow 
that always takes on the same value as Tv). With this 
notation, ¢ can be equivalently written as ¢x. 
A MaxEnt problem with given underlying measure 
is characterized by a tuple (Ox, Mx, ¢x, Cx) (Sec­
tion 3). A valid representation shift of MaxEnt prob­
lem (Ox, Mx, ¢x, Cx) is a triple (Ov, Ow, Mw). Here 
Ov, Ow are sets and Mw is a measure over Ow satis­
fying 
1. Ov is an underlying space both for Ox and for 
Ow; 
2. the random variable Wv determines ¢v; 
3. Mw and Mx are compatible (with underlying 
space Ov; see Section 2). 
Ox is called the original representation space and Ow 
is called the new representation space. 
Intuitively, a representation shift is 'valid' if the con­
straint Ep· [¢] = t can still be expressed in the new 
space. A valid representation shift (Ov, Ow, Mw) in­
duces a new MaxEnt problem (Ow, Mw, ¢w, Cw) de­
fined as follows: 
Pme E [ l Pw(Ww) ] W;Mw := arg max Pw - n M (W ) , PwECw W W 
where Cw is the set of all distributions Pw over Pw 
that are compatible (with underlying space Ov) with 
some Px E C. By Theorem 1 we have that 
me . E [ l Pw(Ww) ] Pw;Mw = arg mm �up PW.- n M (W ) · PwEPw PwECw W W 
The following result is a simple extension of a well­
known theorem (see, for example (Shore & Johnson, 
1980)). It shows that, if a measure Mx for the origi­
nal representation space is available, then a valid rep­
resentation shift leads to the same MaxEnt inferences 
for all random variables Y that can be expressed both 
in terms of the original and in terms of the new rep­
resentation space. In other words, as long as Mx is 
available, MaxEnt is representation independent. 
Theorem 2 Let (Ov, Ow, Mw) be a valid represen­
tation shift for MaxEnt problem (Ox, Mx, ¢x, Cx). 
Then for all Y : Ox -+ R such that X determines 
Y and Wv determines Yv, we have for all y E Oy: 
Pw�Mw (Yw = y) = Px/Mx (Yx = y) 
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The present game-theoretic view provides a novel and 
simple interpretation of this result. Roughly speaking, 
a representation change amounts to a change in the set 
of tickets one can buy in the Kelly gambling game (out­
comes in nw rather than nx); by adopting a measure 
(odds) over Dw that is compatible with the measure 
(odds) Mx over Dx, one ensures that the prices of the 
different tickets will change along with the represen­
tation change so that the gambling game in the new 
space is essentially equivalent to the original game. 
This implies that representation dependence of U­
MaxEnt stems only from the fact that, if we change 
representation from nx to nw' we adopt mutually in­
compatible measures (namely, the uniform measures 
in both spaces). In fact, we can view each measure 
Mx (as long as it is rational-valued) as an implicit re­
representation of the problem to a different underlying 
space Dv in which Mx (or, more precisely, the mea­
sure over Dv that is compatible with Mx) is uniform 
over Dv. We will use of this insight in the next sec­
tion, where we show how to apply MaxEnt in a careful 
manner. 
8 HOW TO APPLY MAXENT 
In this section we return to our previous notation, i.e. 
PJ:;e is short for P)(';'k. 
Whenever in what follows we say 'we apply MaxEnt for 
guessing Ep· [Y IZ] relative to measure M' this means 
that we use PJ:;e, defined for a set of constraints C as 
given by (3) as follows: we observe the value z taken 
on by Z. Then we infer (guess) that 
Ep;:;• [YIZ = z] � Ep. [YIZ = z]. (12) 
where P* is the unknown 'true' distribution. We want 
to arrive at the general conditions on ¢, Y and Z under 
which inference (12) can be expected to be a reason­
able guess and we want to know what Agent should 
do if he does not know what M to pick. To treat 
this question in full generality, we will assume that 
Agent uses a set M of 'a priori possible underlying 
measures'. The case where an underlying measure or 
prior M is available can now be formulated by setting 
M := {M}. In the case where we have a definite rea­
son to pick nx as our basic representation space (e.g. 
the case of throwing dice, see Example 1), we can take 
M := { U x}, where U x is the uniform measure over 
Dx. If no underlying measure can be determined at 
all, we will set M to be the class of all measures over 
Dx. As we will see, this will make MaxEnt undefined 
in most cases. In order to make it well-defined, we 
must first guess a subset M' of M; that case will be 
treated in Section 8.3. 
We are now ready to present our hierarchy of different 
forms of applying MaxEnt. 
Definition 1 Application of MaxEnt for guessing 
Ep. [YIZ] relative to a set of measures M is called 
1. conditionally correct if Ep;:;·[YIZ = z] 
Ep· [YIZ = z] for all M E M, all z E Dz, all 
P* E C. 
2. conditionally calibrated if there exists a ran­
dom variable V such that Z determines V, and 
Ep;:;· [YIZ = z] = Ep;:;• [Y/Vz = Vz(z)] = 
Ep·(Y/Vz = Vz(z)] for all ME M, all z E Dz, 
all P* E C. 
3. well-defined if Epm•[YIZ = z] = Epm•[YIZ = Ml M2 
z] for all M1, M2 EM, all z E Dz. 
4. ill-defined otherwise. 
We note that 1. => 2. => 3. Category 2., while perhaps 
the most interesting, takes too long to discuss here. 
It will be explained in detail in the journal version 
of this paper. Category 4. concerns applications of 
Maximum Entropy that lead to arbitrary results and 
hence should be avoided (but see the next section!). By 
the discussion of the previous section, every (rational­
valued) measure M E M corresponds to an 'allowed' 
representation shift. Therefore, ill-defined applications 
of MaxEnt with respect to the set of all measures 
over Dx correspond to those applications of U -MaxEnt 
that are representation dependent. The other extreme 
is Category 1, which concerns applications of Max­
imum Entropy that are completely without risk. If 
MaxEnt is 'conditionally correct' for Ep· [Y/Z == z], 
the guess Ep;:;•[YIZ = z] = Ep·[YIZ = z] is guaran­
teed to be correct and involves no inductive inference. 
Theorem 3 below determines when this is the case. 
8.1 CONDITIONAL CORRECTNESS 
Let 'ljJ : Dx -+ R and ¢ : Dx -+ Rk be two 
functions and let A � nx. We say that 'ljJ is an 
affine function of ¢ over subdomain A if there exists 
(a:0, ... , ak) E Rk+1 such that for all x E A, 'l/J(x) = 
a:o + L�=l a:;¢;(x) . We define the support SUPP of 
P'x � Px by 
SUPP(P'x) := {x E nx I P(x) > 0 for some p E P'x}. 
Theorem 3 If 'ljJ is an affine function of¢ over subdo­
main SUPP(C), then for all Pt, P2* E C, Ept('l/J(X)] = 
Ep;('l/J(X)]. If 'ljJ is not an affine function of ¢ over 
subdomain SUPP(C) then there exist Pt, P2 E C such 
that Eptf'l/J(X)] ::j:. Ep;('l/J(X)]. 
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Let Z be a 'trivial' random variable, i.e. 'Vx E 
Ox, Z(x) = 1. Theorem 1 implies that for any ME M 
and any C of form (3), PJ:;e E C. Theorem 3 now 
gives that for arbitrary sets of measures M, apply­
ing MaxEnt to guess Ep· [YIZ] is conditionally cor­
rect iff Y is an affine function of ¢ over subdomain 
SUPP(C). To determine whether applying MaxEnt to 
guess Ep· [YIZ] is conditionally correct for non-trivial 
Z (the case that Z(x) varies over SUPP(C)), we inter­
pret the conditioning event Z = z as the additional 
constraint Ep· [1z=z] = 1. Clearly, this constraint is 
of the required form (2). Let, for z E Oz, 
c(z) = c n {P* E Px I Ep·[1z=zl = 1}. (13) 
Then, by the same reasoning as above, applying Max­
Ent to guess Ep· [YIZ] is conditionally correct iff Y 
is an affine function of ¢ over subdomain SUPP(C(z)) 
for all z E Oz. This seems to imply that 'correct' 
applications of MaxEnt are trivial: if we know that 
Y is affine in ¢, i.e. Y(x) = ao + 2::7=1 a;¢;(x), 
we can also directly infer that Ep· [Y] = a0 + 
2::7=1 a;Ep·[¢;(X)] = a0 + 2::7=1 a;Ep;;•[¢;(X)] = 
Ep;;• [Y(X)] (the second equality follows because 
both P* and PJ:;e are members of C). However, 
there is at least one case where 'correct' applications 
are not entirely trivial. From Theorem 1 we see 
that for all P* E C, Ep;;·[-ln(P£;e(X)/M(X))] = 
Ep· [-ln(PMe(X)/M(X))] (indeed, it turns out that 
-ln(PMe(·)/M(·)) is an affine function of ¢). This 
means that MaxEnt is 'correct' for inferring the ex­
pected logarithmic loss in the games described in Sec­
tion 5, e.g. in Kelly Gambling with odds determined 
by M. This can be interpreted as follows: imagine 
an Agent who adopts pMe and uses it for prediction 
of outcomes in Ox with respect to log-loss relative to 
measure M. For gambling strategy o E Px, he expects 
to incur loss Ep;;• [-In ;J{JJ) ]. Agent therefore decides 
to use the o which minimizes this, which by the infor­
mation inequality (Section 5) is given by o = pMe. Us­
ing this choice of o, Agent expects to make an average 
loss of Ep;;·[-ln(PMe(X)/M(X))]. In reality, he will 
make an average loss of Ep.[-ln(PMe(X)/M(X))]. 
Since these two are equal, Agent will have the right 
idea of how well he will be able to predict on average 
even if pMe is wrong. 
8.2 REPRESENTATION DEPENDENCE 
By Definition 1, if M contains only a single element, 
MaxEnt is well-defined for guessing Ep. [YIZ] for all 
Y and Z. By Theorem 2, the guesses are also repre­
sentation independent. The other extreme is the case 
where no underlying measure is known at all and M 
contains all measures over Ox. It is straightforward 
to show 
Proposition 1 Suppose M contains all measures 
over Ox. Then MaxEnt is ill-defined for guessing 
Ep. [YIZ] iff it is not conditionally correct for guessing 
Ep.[YIZJ. 
Since different measures correspond to different repre­
sentations, this corresponds to the fact that U-MaxEnt 
is highly representation dependent. The only way we 
can get to the interesting cases 2. and 3. of Defini­
tion 1 is by restricting the set of available measures M. 
It seems we have not gained anything so far, since we 
do not know how this should be done (we have already 
seen that choosing M = {Ux }, with Ux the uniform 
measure over Ox leads to representation dependence)! 
But it turns out that if the functions ¢, Y and Z are 
related in certain ways, then we can choose a subset of 
M in a different way that does preserve representation 
independence. 
8.3 REPRESENTATION INDEPENDENCE 
We want to first select a subset M' of M and then 
apply MaxEnt to guess Ep· [YIZ] in such a way that 
the whole (2-step) procedure becomes representation 
independent. Since we have no fixed measure or prior 
over Ox, the choice of flx as our basic sample space is 
essentially arbitrary. Therefore our procedure for se­
lecting measures should give the same result for every 
alternative choice of sample space in which both the 
constraint Ep· [¢] = t and the guess Ep· [YIZ] can be 
expressed. Our previous analysis suggests a novel way 
of guessing M' which in many cases achieves this. It is 
based on the idea that the 'observables' in our problem 
are really the outcomes in Oq, and not the outcomes in 
Ox. This suggests postulating a uniform measure Uq, 
over Oq, rather than Ox. If we then restrict the func­
tions 'lj; about which we make guesses to those that are 
determined by ¢, the arbitrary choice of our basic rep­
resentation space Ox becomes irrelevant and we are 
guaranteed to make the same predictions independent 
of whatever Ox we choose. We now formalize this 
idea. 
When no underlying measure is given, a MaxEnt prob­
lem is determined by a triple (Ox, ¢x, Cx). Note that, 
compared to the treatment in Section 7, the measure 
Mx is missing. A valid representation shift of such a 
MaxEnt problem is a pair (Ov, Ow) such that (1) Ov 
is an underlying space both for Ox and for Ow; and 
(2), the random variable Wv determines ¢v (again, 
compare to the definition of valid representation shift 
in Section 7). The representation shift leads to a new 
MaxEnt problem (Ow, ¢w, Cw) where Cw is the set of 
distributions over Ow compatible to Cx (compatibility 
with respect to underlying space Ov). 
Let (Ov, Ow) be any valid representation shift of the 
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MaxEnt problem (Ox, ¢x, Cx ). Let U,p be the uniform 
measure over Oct>. Let M� be the class of all measures 
over Ox that are compatible with U,p, and let Mw be 
the class of all measures over Ow that are compati­
ble with U,p (compatibility with respect to underlying 
space Ov). 
Proposition 2 (Bertrand's Paradox 'resolved') 
Let 'lj; : Ox ---+ R be a random variable in the 
original representation space. If 4> determines 'lj; on 
SUPP(C), then for all Mw E Mw and all Mx E M�, 
Ep�· ['lj;w] = Ep�· ['lj;x]; if 4> does not determine W;Mw X;Mx 
'lj; on SUPP(C), there exist Mx, M'x E M� such that 
Ep�e ['lj;x] =f. Ep�e ['lj;x]. X;Mx X;M� 
The proposition says that our two-step procedure gives 
representation independence iff MaxEnt is used to 
guess functions 'lj; that are determined by ¢. Defining 
cCz) as in (13) and reasoning exactly as below Theo­
rem 3, we obtain the following (informally stated) 
Corollary 1 The procedure of first setting Mx to be 
the set of measures over Ox that are compatible with 
Uct> and then applying MaxEnt to guess Ep. [YIZ] rel­
ative to set of measures Mx is a representation inde­
pendent procedure iff, for all z E Oz, ¢ determines Y 
over subdomain SUPP(C(zl). In particular this will be 
the case if 4> determines both Y and Z. 
Summarizing, if all measures M over Ox are a priori 
possible, then instead of using U-MaxEnt it may be 
better to adopt a uniform measure U,p over the space 
of observables O,p. In this way one obtains a proce­
dure which is representation independent for guessing 
a large class of random variables Y conditional on a 
large class of random variables Z. The measure U ¢ 
induces a set Mx of compatible measures over Ox. 
If Y and Z are such that even for this restricted set 
of measures, applying MaxEnt to guess Ep· [YIZ] is 
ill-defined, then, in our view, any specific guess of 
Ep· [YIZ] obtained by a further restriction of M� is 
basically arbitrary. We feel that in such cases, one 
should refrain from using MaxEnt altogether. 
9 FINAL REMARKS 
Non-convex constraints A major goal for future 
work is to analyze the behavior of PJ(e in minimax 
terms for constraints that go beyond form (2). For 
inequality constraints (E[¢(X)] 2: t), adjusted ver­
sions of all our results still hold. For constraints such 
that C becomes non-convex, MaxEnt is known to lead 
to rather strange results. Interestingly, for such con­
straints, Theorem 1 does not apply and the minimax 
PJ:le is not equal any more to the traditional max­
imin PJ:le. We suspect that the minimax version gives 
preferable results in such cases. Consider for exam­
ple disjunctive constraints (Grove et al., 1994): let 
Ox = {0, 1}, M uniform, and let the constraint be 
[P*(X = 1) = 0.1] V [P*(X = 1) = 0.95]. Then 
traditional MaxEnt gives PJ.:;e(X = 1) = 0.1 which 
seems a dangerous guess - if it is wrong, it will lead 
to very bad predictions. In contrast, minimax PJ:}e 
gives PJ:}e(X = 1) = 0.5 (one can show that it co­
incides with the traditional MaxEnt distribution over 
the convex hull of C) which -to us -seems more rea­
sonable. 
Related Work (Haussler, 1997) has given a related 
(but still essentially different) minimax result involv­
ing logarithmic regret rather than loss. (Halpern & 
Koller, 1995) note that MaxEnt can be made repre­
sentation independent for a restricted class of repre­
sentation shifts by restricting the class of priors M in 
a certain way, but they do not use this to distinguish 
between different uses (guesses of Ep· ['lj;] for different 
'lj;) of the same PJ:le. 
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